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# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW

SEPTEMBER, 1916

## THE POLITICAL SITUATION

AS VIEWED BY MR. WORTHINGTON

BY THE EDITOR

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*Mr. William P. Worthington of Boston, Massachusetts, was introduced to the readers of this REVIEW in November, 1915, when he discoursed at length, in conversation with his nephew, a young banker, upon "Patriotism and Profits." He was then depicted as a retired merchant of a philosophical turn of mind, firm in his convictions and patriotic to the core of his being. Again he is seated in his library when his nephew enters, greets him respectfully and opens the conversation, the two thereafter speaking alternately.*

—Well, sir, here I am again!

—So I perceive. And, as ever, I am grateful that you should favor me with your companionship at the sacrifice of more pleasurable diversions.

—Oh, come, now, I can't stand for that. The obligation is quite the other way around.

—Thank you. There are times when I find the manners of the present generation most agreeable.

—Uncle, I am in trouble,—no, not financially; I am all right that way. I am bewildered politically. I am to cast my first ballot next November and I have come to you for enlightenment and counsel.

—But I am a Democrat.

—I know, and I am by inheritance and tradition a Republican, but we can safely consider ourselves as both good Americans, can't we?

—I hope so.

—Besides, you are not such a very rigid Democrat.

—I never voted for Mr. Bryan, if that is what you mean. But I did not forsake my party when I followed Palmer and Buckner. My party forsook me.

—You hold, then, as a believer in responsible party government, that a citizen should stand with his organization unless there should clearly appear a conclusive reason why he should renounce it for the time being?

—That is the established creed of your party declared with positiveness by your candidate. I should say that, as a Republican, you are bound by it.

—And you correspondingly as a Democrat?

—Not in the present instance. Our leader has absolved me from that obligation in two ways. Recently in a speech in Washington he appealed for re-election specifically as a non-partisan and declared that, in the present situation, party lines should be obliterated. I surmise that he had Republicans and Progressives more particularly in mind, but of course the rule works both ways. It is a natural and consistent position for him to assume. Mr. Wilson has never been a partisan. Wholly aside from his reiterated professions of independence, his record shows conclusively that he regards the Democratic party as merely a political means to a personal end. He will tolerate the organization during a campaign, but he never fails to disown it on the day after election. He won much acclaim by doing this in New Jersey, when as Governor he utterly ignored the organization which had achieved his election. He has pursued the same policy as President. The Clark majority in Baltimore comprised the bone and sinew, the old conservative stock of the party, from States like Massachusetts and Kentucky. The Wilson element consisted of the rag, tag and bobtail, former Populists, Bryanites and the like. This sufficed for the nomination, but it was the sturdy old band of regulars, led by the Speaker himself, that won the election. And they had their labor for their pains. Chairman McCombs strove valiantly for their recognition, but to so little purpose that he, too, was driven to the wall and did not even mention the President's name when speaking as the official

head of the party in St. Louis. The Speaker himself was wholly ignored until his assistance in obtaining legislation became essential. In point of fact, I can think of but two of the old-stock or Clark Democrats who received appointments—Martin J. Wade of Iowa, for personal reasons, and James W. Gerard, in appreciation of financial help. Clearly the President considered himself under no obligation to the party as a party. Indeed, you may recall that while the outcome in Baltimore was in doubt Mr. Wilson was speculating with his family upon the prospects of a long visit to the lakes of England. It seems never to have crossed his mind that he might owe any service to his party unless he himself were to be the beneficiary. The policy is comprehensible, of course, to a student of human nature, but I fear that the consequences in November, in States like New York, Illinois and Missouri, may not be altogether gratifying.

—You spoke of another reason why you consider yourself acquitted of party allegiance.

—Yes; it is to be found in abandonment of Democratic doctrine. The President's espousal of Protection for Protection's sake is, of course, a flat repudiation of the chief Democratic principle of a revenue tariff, but even that sinks into insignificance when compared with Federal interference with purely domestic concerns. If the Democratic party ever has stood or now stands for anything at all, it is for the right of local self-government. Nobody understands that better than the President himself. You cannot find anywhere a clearer exposition of the fatal folly of attempting to impose upon communities "paternal morals, morals enforced by the judgment and choices of the central authority at Washington" than he has made.

"The proposed Federal legislation with regard to the regulation of child labor," he declared, "affords a striking example. If the power to regulate commerce between the States can be stretched to include the regulation of labor in mills and factories, it can be made to embrace every particular of the industrial organization of the country. The only limitations Congress would observe should the Supreme Court assent to such obviously absurd extravagances of interpretation would be the limitation of opinion and circumstances."

—But, Uncle, I thought the President was in favor of this very legislation.

—I do not know whether he is or not. The words I have quoted he used in his lecture on constitutional government in 1908. True, I did read the other day that he had visited the Capitol in person and demanded the immediate enactment of the vicious Bill which he condemned so sharply eight years ago. It may be that, with that remarkable facility for changing his mind upon which he prides himself, Mr. Wilson has formed a contrary opinion, but I hardly think so. In fact, I haven't a doubt that he still regards such legislation as fundamentally wrong and that he has no expectation that the Supreme Court will "assent to such obviously absurd extravagances of interpretation." I do not see how any intelligent student of our system of government can think otherwise.

—But you are in favor of the regulation of child labor?

—Assuredly,—by the States; and in this instance the States have not been neglectful. All but three, if I am not mistaken, already have enacted excellent laws upon this subject,—laws properly adapted to local conditions. Even if they had not, "the remedy," as Mr. Wilson said in 1908, "lies not outside the States, but within them", and "in no case will their failure to correct their own measures prove that the Federal Government might have forced wisdom upon them."

—How then, assuming that Mr. Wilson is of the same opinion still, do you account for his reversal of position?

—Dr. Eliot has stated the reason.

—Dr. Eliot?

—Yes, our own revered President Emeritus, who wrote a letter to Senator John W. Kern which that distinguished leader, with characteristic stupidity, had read to the Senate. Here it is:

ASTICOU, ME., *July 21, 1916.*

HON. JOHN W. KERN.

MY DEAR SIR: I venture to express the opinion that in view of the coming Presidential election it would be very unwise to postpone the passage of the child-labor bill until December next. The Democratic Party needs the support next November of the numerous Republicans and Progressives who are interested in the child-labor legislation. The party has nothing to lose by passing the bill, and possibly much to gain.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES W. ELIOT.

There you have the whole story. It was "in view of the coming Presidential election" and nothing else that Mr. Wilson suddenly, after three years of passivity, awoke to the pressing need of this legislation. A few Southern Senators made a gallant stand for the preservation of the fundamental principle of the Democratic party, but they could not prevail against the power and prestige of the President. Jefferson, Jackson, Tilden and Cleveland are disowned and so necessarily, as a Democrat irrevocably opposed to sumptuary legislation, am I. Again for the time being my party has left me, not I my party.

—But did not the Republicans in Congress also support the measure?

—In a large measure, yes. But they violated no professed doctrine in doing so. The Republican party has always been a Federalist party. Consequently it has not broken faith. That is the difference.

—Is not the same issue involved in the question of Woman Suffrage; that is, as between granting the privilege of voting through action by the States, as advocated by Mr. Wilson, and doing so by constitutional amendment, as urged by Mr. Hughes?

—Not so sharply, no; indeed, perhaps not at all. Mr. Hughes has at least the ground of precedent to stand upon. In fact, the first and most notable performance of his party was the bestowal of the vote upon the negroes by this process. The practical nullification by some of the States does not alter the fact.

—But has the Nation a moral right to impose Woman Suffrage upon States which do not want it?

—It did impose Negro Suffrage upon States which did not want it. New Jersey, Maryland, Kentucky, Delaware, California and Oregon rejected the Fifteenth Amendment and even New York rescinded its ratification. But for the exercise of the Federal power over elections negroes would not be permitted to vote in those States today. Nor would Senators be elected by popular vote in Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah or Virginia. While then, personally and as a Democrat, I favor the determination of all such questions by the States, I have to concede the general right of the Nation with respect to elections. While, too, I believe in the wisdom of extending suf-

frage to women, I was not impressed by the reason advanced by Mr. Hughes.

—You mean because it is inevitable?

—Precisely. Presumed inevitableness does not constitute justification for acceptance of a policy deemed to be inherently unsound. On the contrary, it should induce even more vigorous resistance. Mr. Hughes would have been on solid ground if he had rested his case upon the fact that a far greater proportion of the people demand the constitutional extension than called for the Senatorial amendment. I wonder that he did not.

—I notice that Mr. Wilson criticises Mr. Hughes for going beyond his platform; that he “cannot see how candidates can consistently disregard these official declarations.”

—Mr. Wilson is hardly in a position to make that point, in view of his own repeated repudiations of “official declarations.” He did, if I mistake not, solemnly assure the suffragists soon after he became President that he could not possibly uphold a movement not mentioned in his party platform, but later he not only declared, but somewhat ostentatiously voted, for it. He could now, if he deemed best, pronounce for the amendment with equal consistency. Indeed, I have heard expressed a strong suspicion that he would have done so if Mr. Hughes, as the phrase runs, had not “beat him to it.” But one should not question even a candidate’s sincerity on a mere rumor. We have to assume that both Mr. Hughes and Mr. Wilson are actuated in this matter by profound convictions, giving only incidental heed to the ninety-one electoral votes hanging in the balance. In any case, Suffrage has become a question of method only, not of principle.

—What to your mind is the dominant issue?

—Give me your idea.

—From the Democratic standpoint that the President “has kept us out of war.”

—That no doubt is correct; that is to say, the chief appeal to the country rests upon that assertion. Of course, it is not true. The President has not kept us out of war. He put us into war when, before Congress had given him the power, he employed the “armed forces of the United States” to enforce a personal decree in a neighboring State and he repeated the operation when he ordered the troops to invade the

same country. Battles have been fought and blood has been shed to a far greater extent than is commonly supposed by the regular soldiers of both countries. We are at war now and will continue to be so long as an American soldier remains on foreign soil against the protest of that duly recognized foreign Government. But you were not referring to the crimes against Mexico?

—No; to the European situation.

—So I supposed. Well, assuming that there has been no danger of armed conflict with the Allies, it all resolves to our relationship with the Central Powers.

—Yes.

—But the President has not kept us out of war with them. They have kept out of war with us for most excellent reasons of their own. Mr. Wilson invited trouble when he handed the Austrian Ambassador his passports, but the Austrian Emperor refused to take up the gage of battle. It was he, not the President, who averted hostilities by disregarding what at another time would have been considered sufficient excuse if not, indeed, the positive necessity of a Nation proud enough to fight. And it is not the President who has kept us out of war with Germany. It is the Kaiser. Mr. Wilson's Notes have been truculent enough to make for war over and over again, but Germany has averted conflict at each psychological moment out of consideration of her own welfare, not as a consequence of any of the many things the President has written. And she has done it in her own sweet way at her own chosen time. Personally I do not believe that we have been in danger of war at any stage. Nobody could afford to drag us in and nobody has done so. That is all there is of it. If we had convinced all warring Powers at the outset that we really meant to maintain our rights as a neutral, we would have obtained them beyond the shadow of a doubt. But our shillyshallying with Mexico had indicated all too plainly that they could play fast and loose with us with impunity. And they have done it,—both sides.

—What about the abandonment of submarine warfare by Germany?

—I do not know that it has been abandoned. It has not been prosecuted so murderously of late because Germany found that its effectiveness for the time at any rate did not warrant the cost. But it may be resumed at any moment.



As Mr. Norman Hapgood says, in celebrating the President's "great diplomatic triumph," our rights at sea may be considered as established unless or until the operations shall be resumed; and then, he adds naïvely, we should be at war. So you see it all rests, as it all has rested from the beginning, with the Kaiser. The President can only hope and pray that Germany will see no advantage to herself in renewing her former practices until after election day. Otherwise, as in the last instance when a tentative concession was insultingly made in response to American public opinion, not to the President, further surly observations may be forthcoming, as usual, after the event. But you may rest assured that Germany is still ready, as she has been ready throughout, to do whatever is necessary to avoid war with the United States.

—I should like to ask you this: Are you, as an American, satisfied with President Wilson's foreign policy?

—I could hardly answer yes to that while the officially avowed assassination of American citizens on the *Lusitania* continues unatoned for, while England is permitted to disregard our established trading rights and while the massacre of our soldiers at Parral and Carrizal still evokes only honeyed words in an effort to placate the disdainful Carranza. But the unhappy fact is that I cannot discover that Mr. Wilson has any foreign policy, except perhaps denial of the right of American citizens to protection beyond our borders. He has partially disposed of each case as it has arisen without fixity of purpose or heed to any general line of conduct,—attempting, vainly as a rule, to lock the door after the horse is stolen. The vacillation of the Administration no doubt merits all the censure it is receiving, but to my mind its dilatoriness has produced far more serious consequences. When it has done the right thing, it has done it almost invariably at the wrong time,—generally too late. The mere fact that Germany finally agreed—for how long nobody can tell—to give unoffending passengers a chance for existence is proof conclusive that she would have yielded in the beginning, if she had been convinced that we meant what we said,—and hundreds of lives would have been saved.

—Then you agree with Mr. Hughes that the tragedy of the *Lusitania* could have been averted?

—Undoubtedly. If the German Ambassador had been called sharply to account and warned as he should have been

on the day when he published his impudent notification to American travelers, it is most unlikely that the vessel would have been sunk. Whether Mr. Hughes himself as President would have acted with essential promptness is a question. I am disposed to doubt it. Nobody at the time, of course, believed that any nation claiming to be civilized would really commit so damnable an outrage. All we really know is that, whatever another might have done, Mr. Wilson not only did nothing but, even more disquietingly, as we contemplate the future, he has repeatedly shown evidences of temperamental incapacity to grasp and master a critical situation at the psychological moment.

—But the Democratic spokesmen insist that all that is ancient history, that it is idle to harp upon what has happened, and that Mr. Hughes should inform the country what he would do now or in the immediate future.

—True, what is done cannot be undone; but what has been done affords the only indication of what would be done again by the same authority. It is Mr. Wilson, not Mr. Hughes, who is on trial, and he can be judged only by his acts. It may seem smart to demand from Mr. Hughes a precise statement of the way in which he, if elected, will meet a hypothetical contingency, for the simple reason, of course, that he cannot answer. Nor can Mr. Wilson. Nor could anybody. Mr. Norman Hapgood declares that the President will make war on Germany if she renews her illegal submarine activities, but I doubt if Mr. Wilson would commit himself so far. In any case, there is as much reason in requiring a definite declaration from the one as from the other. All such truculent queries are silly,—cheap and tawdry political claptrap. As well might Nero have stopped fiddling upon a certain occasion and demanded of the Romans:

“As you may perceive, the city is burning. I may or may not be responsible. What does it matter? It is useless for you to say that another might have prevented the fire, but the deed is done. The only question now is, what are you going to do about it?”

The Romans, overwhelmed by the logic and power of their ruler, did nothing; but I suspect that, if they had been Americans, they would have replied:

“We are first going to get rid of Nero. Then we shall save what we can from the wreck and rebuild the city.”

That is the answer which, in fact, William M. Tweed did

receive when he propounded a like question following the political devastation of New York, and which, in truth, is the only one that can be made to unfaithful or incapable public servants. It typifies precisely the attitude of Mr. Hughes and his party in the present situation, and they are wholly within their rights and the proprieties when they pronounce it conclusive.

—You do not agree, then, with those who criticize Mr. Hughes for attacking the Administration so sharply?

—I did not complain of Mr. Wilson's assaults upon the Taft administration four years ago. Nor to my knowledge did Mr. Taft. It is an odd and interesting circumstance that the present Government seems really and quite honestly, for some inexplicable reason, to regard itself as immune to ordinary strictures. Its very inefficiency is smug. Witness the Bryan-that-was and Josephus and Redfield and the Wandering Mouse!

—What of Lane and Houston?

—Exceptionally capable, industrious and trustworthy officials, so far as one can discern. I hold, too, and believe that the results will demonstrate, that Mr. McAdoo has made an admirable Secretary of the Treasury, clear-headed, broad-minded and courageous. Garrison was, of course, the best of the lot, but the man who has rendered by far the greatest service to Mr. Wilson is Mr. Tumulty. With the possible exception of Colonel Lamont, no Secretary to a President has been his equal in combined tact, diplomacy, astuteness, tirelessness and personal devotion.

—And Mr. Burleson?

—Mr. Burleson has been necessarily what you of the present generation quite graphically depict as the goat. It has been his difficult task to put deserving Democrats into the offices without impairing the reputation of his chief as a true civil service reformer,—former Vice President, in fact, of Doctor Eliot's impolitic Association. He has failed measurably in both endeavors, but is entitled to credit for doing the best he could. The President belied his professions and made a grievous blunder when he let Mr. Bryan run riot in the diplomatic service, but I cannot become resentful over the cancellation of Mr. Taft's political death-bed-conversion order "covering in" 30,000 Republican postmasters. If Wilson, defeated for re-election, should do the same thing, I shall watch the course of Mr. Hughes with interest. It is

a fact, I believe, that Mr. Wilson's is the first recent Administration under which the classified service has not been extended, and that is unfortunate because it savors of hypocrisy; but even so I find myself unmoved by the righteous indignation of Senator Boies Penrose.

—Why does not Mr. Hughes reject the so-called hyphe-nated support?

—Why does not Mr. Wilson? For the identical reason. They both want all the votes they can get. No two public men in the country have denounced and fought political bossism more vigorously; and yet I have not heard that Mr. Hughes has repelled Mr. Penrose, while only this morning the Democratic Chairman announces exultantly that Mr. Charles F. Murphy is enthusiastic for Mr. Wilson. So far as German-born citizens are concerned, a large majority have always been Republicans and will probably follow their traditional bent. Some doubtless will vote against Mr. Wilson because of dissatisfaction with his conduct of international affairs. So will a good many Anglo-Americans for the same reason. But the actual voting influence of sympathy with the various warring countries has been greatly exaggerated. My own impression is that a larger number of German-Americans than usual will vote the Democratic ticket this year because they think Mr. Wilson is less likely than Mr. Hughes to encourage measures abridging personal liberty. Talk of opposing Mr. Hughes as "the Kaiser's candidate" is sheer humbug. As well one might urge the rejection of Mr. Wilson because the Czar hopes he will win. Once concede that the favorable attitude of a foreign ruler does or should operate to the prejudice of a candidate and you admit the power of that ruler to influence an election by ostensibly disapproving of his real choice. Specious negative pleading of that kind is not argument; it is nonsense.

—And yet there does seem to be a difference between Mr. Wilson's attitude with respect to the election and that of Mr. Hughes. I see no objection to Mr. Hughes being, as he expressed it, "100 per cent. candidate." I think he ought to be. But I must say that I liked the announcement from the White House that the President was so wholly engrossed in official duties that he firmly refrained from participating in the political canvass.

—Then you assume that Mr. Vance McCormick's constant consultations with Mr. Wilson bear upon purely public af-

fairs and that the luncheon parties at the White House for State leaders are given for the enlightenment of the President, let us say, upon international problems?

—Well, I——

—Well, don't. Your "difference" is only a distinction. Mr. Hughes considers it advantageous to appear eager to carry his party into power while Mr. Wilson feels that a certain coyness will curry favor with the people. Mr. Hughes has been so long out of political harness that he really has to labor to appear ardent. Mr. Wilson has no such difficulty. He could seem to be 150 per cent. candidate if it seemed advisable. But both may safely be reckoned at par.

—Granting that the most effective Democratic appeal is to the spirit of gratefulness for prevailing peace and prosperity, what are the real issues from the Republican standpoint?

—Patriotism vs. Pacifism. Protection of American Lives and Properties the World Over. True Preparedness. Constructive Policies. Party Government vs. Personal Government. Higher Tariff Duties to Safeguard both Labor and Capital against Foreign Competition. Efficiency. Economy. Personality. Character.

—That sounds good to me.

—Naturally. As you remarked, you are a Republican.

—But you?

—I am still a Democrat; quite still, as David B. Hill once observed, but yet true to my colors. Whether I shall vote for Mr. Wilson, feeling free as I do to form an independent judgment, is not determined in my mind. I am waiting to hear what he has to say for himself. So far Mr. Hughes has been less explicit with respect to the future than I should like, but, if such a simile be permissible in view of his former predilections, his blanket has not been off very long. It may turn out, as some suggest, that he is not the man he used to be and maybe never was, but on the other hand we must consider the probable effect of re-election upon what Grover Cleveland called the "selfish and domineering" spirit of Mr. Wilson. The coming month should be a time of meditation and perhaps, in striving for accurate differentiation between two ministers' sons, of prayer.

—I wonder if you would agree with my Finn?

—What does your Finn say?

—"Weel-sen ees not so guhdt. He goes oudt. Now Huhn-gus comes in."

—I neither agree nor disagree. Another month should point the way.

## THE "TRAITORS" OF TWO CENTURIES

ROGER CASEMENT was a traitor. So much must be conceded, though without conceding that it was well to send him to a traitor's death. There is no valid definition of the word which makes it inapplicable to him. The definition of treason in the Constitution of the United States is of all most lenient and least drastic. Yet under both of its prescriptions, Casement must have been accounted guilty. He levied war against the Government and integrity of his country, and he adhered to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort. All this must be frankly conceded, even by those who were most friendly to him and to the cause which he sought to serve, and by those who most question, deplore or condemn the action of the British Government in putting him to death. It is no charity, nor favor, nor justice to his memory to pretend otherwise.

There are those who say that if he was a traitor, so was Washington. To that we demur. The two cases are not analogous. However the American Revolutionists may have been regarded under the British laws of the Eighteenth Century, they were not traitors according to the American interpretation of the term. They were not traitors even in the brief period before the Declaration of Independence, while after that event they were not regarded as traitors by the British Government of that time. Washington and his colleagues, prior to July 4, 1776, did not levy war against Great Britain in the sense meant by our Constitution in its definition of treason. They were not trying to overthrow it, or to expel it. They were simply resisting with force and arms some of its administrative acts—a very different thing. Certainly they were not adhering to its enemies, for the French alliance was not made until long afterward; and France, after all, was not an avowed or recognized enemy of Great Britain when that alliance was finally made. Rebels our Revolutionists were, but rebellion is not always identical with treason.

So much for the ante-Independence period. After the

Declaration the status was radically changed. In one sense, it is true, the Revolutionists were more like traitors, since they unquestionably were levying war, in the fullest sense, against the British Government, and they were presently adhering to its enemies, giving them, or receiving from them, aid and comfort. Nevertheless, the open establishment of a new and fully organized Government, which was capable of exercising and did in fact exercise the functions of Government, both in authority and in responsibility, placed them rather in the category of sovereign belligerents. Apparently the British Government itself thus interpreted the situation. It sent Howe over to enter into negotiations with Washington, and on subsequent occasions during the war it sought or expressed a readiness to engage in negotiations, and they were negotiations such as a Government does not conduct with traitors. Moreover, it did not punish or treat as traitors, but as legitimate prisoners of war, the Revolutionists who fell into its hands, whether private soldiers or high officers.

A radical difference must be perceived between the methods of the American revolutionists and those of Casement and the Sinn Fein. Had Casement followed the example of Washington, he would have remained in Ireland, and there would have led militant resistance to the abuses and oppressions of the British Government. If, and when, he found such resistance to be ineffectual for inducing reforms, he would have proceeded to organize and to put into practical operation an Irish Government publicly proclaimed as an independent sovereignty. This latter, it is true, was in a measure done by the Sinn Fein. But that was done in a radically different fashion from the corresponding act in America. Moreover, before that outbreak, and before there was any public manifestation of its imminence, Casement was engaged in his intrigues with the enemies of Great Britain.

It cannot be argued that Casement did not recognize the British Government as his, or as the lawful Government of Ireland. On the contrary, he *did* conspicuously thus recognize it. If he had been an avowed opponent of that Government, his status would have been different, and far more favorable—morally if not in legal technicality. But he was not. He was no follower of Stephens, of Michael Davitt, or of O'Donovan Rossa; of Parnell, Biggar or Redmond. On the contrary, he gave every indication of loyal acquiescence

in and support of British rule. He accepted, he solicited, honorable and pecuniarily profitable employment at the hands of the British Government. For nearly a score of years he was an active, conspicuous, useful and presumably loyal officer of the consular service, in Africa and in South America. Also he accepted knighthood and other decorations at the hand of the King. Surely, this was ample recognition of the British Government as his and as Ireland's Government. Down to the beginning of the present war there was no hint nor symptom of his disaffection.

These were the circumstances which made his conduct seem the more surprising and his treason the more flagrant. Even then, had he openly renounced allegiance to the British Crown and joined the enemy, he would have occupied a more explicable and more creditable status. But instead, he engaged in secret intrigues for the seduction of British soldiers and for the assistance of the enemies of Great Britain in a secret attempt to invade the British Isles. A clearer case of treason could hardly be imagined than that which is made out by the acknowledged facts in the case.

All this is said without in the least reflecting unfavorably upon the aspirations of Ireland for Home Rule, or even for entire secession from the United Kingdom and from the British Empire. Those aspirations have been cherished by some of the noblest and best Irishmen, and have commanded the earnest sympathy of men in other lands the world over. But again there are radical differences. Emmet did not seek nor accept an office of profit under the British Crown. O'Connell did not conspire with belligerent enemies of the United Kingdom. It was, with Parnell and his fellow Land Leaguers and Home Rulers, an unbroken rule to accept no office from the Government from which they were trying to separate Ireland. John Redmond has not intrigued with Germany. It was the perfidy of Casement in eagerly accepting for many years emoluments and honors from the British Government, and then insidiously and surreptitiously striving to betray it to its enemies, that made his case so flagrant.

Yet all this, too, is to be said without passing upon the wisdom or the unwisdom—perhaps we might say, the justice or the injustice—of meting out to him the irretrievable penalty of death. From the point of view of political policy—which is not always the most exalted point of view—it is perhaps an open question whether it might not have been



better to treat him with clemency and mercy. Would the sparing of his life have been regarded as clemency and as the generosity of a great Power, or as a confession of weakness and of fear? From a higher point of view—from the standpoint of moral principle—the question is to be considered whether it is well for a Government thus to treat political crimes against itself with the most extreme severity, while at the same time it refuses to take cognizance of even the gravest political crimes committed against its neighbors. There seems to be a possible incongruity in a nation's hanging its own traitors and at the same time giving inviolable asylum to the traitors of other lands so as to prevent them, too, from being hanged.

From another point of view the propriety of the hanging of Casement may be called into question. That is the point of view which has regard to his sanity or insanity, and therefore to his moral responsibility. He was known to be, and always to have been, a man of supersensitive nerves and of extravagant impulses. He served arduously for years in a tropical climate, in precisely such a climate as has notoriously in India caused many a better ballasted man than he to go "off his head"—that is, to have his mental faculties detrimentally affected if not entirely wrecked by intense physical discomfort and suffering, conjoined with hard intellectual labor and an overburdening of his sensibilities and sympathies. Now Casement performed exhausting labors in the Putumayo region; his mind and heart were unspeakably agonized by the contemplation of the inhuman atrocities which he was instrumental in exposing to the world; and it was in a climate of peculiarly maddening torridity. It would require no stretching of the imagination to suppose that these conditions and circumstances united to impair his mental integrity and equally lessen his moral responsibility.

Upon these questions, however, we cannot assume to pass. It is unhappily now too late for any determination of them which could be profitable to him or to the Government which sent him to the scaffold. All that now remains is a profound regret for a most pitiable tragedy, the double tragedy of the unavailing insurrection and of its ruthless repression and retribution; together, it may be hoped, with a heart-searching consideration of treason and its penalties in the Twentieth Century, compared with the Eighteenth and before. Our own nation dealt with treason and with traitors

in 1861-65 very differently from the way it dealt with them in 1776-83. We are inclined to think that the change was as profitable to us in practice as it was creditable to us in sentiment; and we shall not be charged with egoism if we suggest that our example in that respect might be profitable for emulation by all the world.

## A TALE OF TWO EMPIRES

ONE empire falls; another is exalted and confirmed: that is one of the most impressive and not least important reflections caused by current incidents of the great war. It is a fact which will doubtless prove of transcendent importance not only to the two empires concerned, but also to the whole world.

At the beginning of the war Germany had a colonial empire in three of the grand divisions of the world: Africa, Asia, and Oceanica. It comprised a land area of 1,027,820 square miles, or nearly as much as the whole United States of America. It had a population of more than 12,000,000. Much of it was of immense value, both for the intrinsic richness of its resources and for its strategic location. Germany had spent hundreds of millions of dollars upon it, and was just beginning to get returns, with a prospect of almost boundless future profits.

Today she has lost every inch of that magnificent domain, save perhaps a remnant of East Africa, from which she is rapidly being expelled. We may expect any day to hear that her last soldier there has been captured, and that the German flag flies over not a foot of ground in all the world outside of Germany, and German embassies and legations in alien but friendly lands. Seldom in the history of the world has so vast an empire been so speedily, so completely, and so irrevocably lost.

Concurrently there has been a comparably great exaltation and confirmation of the British colonial empire. It was within the memory of men still living that Lord Beaconsfield, then Mr. Disraeli, Chancellor of the British Exchequer, said of Canada, Australia and the Cape: "Those wretched colonies will all be independent in a few years, and are a millstone round our necks." He lived to think better of it. But at a much later date Lord Morley (then Mr. John Morley) took up the same prophecy. When England became involved

in a serious war, he said, her colonies would refuse men, money, and even sympathy. So, too, Archibald Forbes, the famous war correspondent, predicted the same thing. "I have the implicit conviction," he said, "that if England should ever be engaged in a serious struggle with a Power of strength and means, one of the outcomes would be to detach from her the Australian colonies." We should rather like to hear that repeated now to the Australians who went over and took New Guinea, and to the "Anzacs" who are leading the British battle line at Suez and in France and Flanders!

For the "serious war" has certainly come, the "serious struggle with a Power of strength and means"; and the outcome already is to bind Australia and all the other colonies to Great Britain with bands of brass and triple steel. Practically all this conquest of the German colonial empire has been effected by the British colonial empire. All that Great Britain herself has done has been to hold the high seas, so that Germany could send no succor to her colonies. The British colonials have done the rest. Most notably of all this has been the case in Africa. For the Union of South Africa was the newest and least firmly established of all the great overseas dominions. It was chiefly composed of and was governed by those Boers, of Dutch and French descent, who a few years ago were fighting against Great Britain with a resolution and persistence seldom rivalled in history. The head of the Government was the man who had been chief commander of the Boer army in that war against the British.

Moreover, Great Britain was now involved in war with the Great Power which had been the especial friend of and sympathizer with the Boers in their struggle with her. When Starr Jameson made his mad raid upon Johannesburg, it was the German Emperor who incontinently sent to the Boer President a dispatch of sympathy and encouragement. It is open history that that dispatch was responsible for the subsequent Boer-British war. Down to that time Paul Krüger had been inclined to compromise with Great Britain and to avoid a conflict. But immediately upon the receipt of the Kaiser's message he changed his attitude. Assured, as he thought, of the military support and backing of Germany, he assumed a more defiant and irreconcilable attitude than ever, and rushed into the fatal war with a light and confident heart. And when Germany failed to give him

the support which he had been led to expect, and when the German Emperor refused to receive him when he went to Europe for aid, he died of a broken heart, believing himself betrayed by the very man who had encouraged him to enter the war.

It is known, indeed, that more or less authoritative encouragement of the Boers to resist Great Britain went far beyond the limits of the Kaiser's dispatch to Krüger. It was suggested, both to Krüger and to Steyn, the President of the Orange Free State, that the Boers should expel the British altogether, from Cape Colony, from Natal, and from Rhodesia, and should make all South Africa a Boer Confederation. It was pointed out to them that it would abut at one side upon German Southwest Africa, and at the other upon German East Africa. With these colonies it would enter into close relations, which would be commercially profitable. Also, it would enjoy the political and military protection of Germany. The ultimate purpose was, no doubt, to merge the Boer States into the German colonial empire. To what extent the Kaiser and his ministers were responsible for these intrigues and suggestions may not now be confidently declared. Certain it is that such notions were widely disseminated among the Boers, and had a decisive effect upon them.

With these antecedent circumstances, it would not have been strange if British statesmen had felt some anxiety concerning the course of the South African Union in the present war. If it was felt, however, it was not expressed; and it was soon made evident that there had been no ground for it. The Boers were as loyal as the British themselves. They were practically a unit for supporting Great Britain in the war, and they would have sent an army to France and Flanders had it not been considered, in England as well as in South Africa, better to send it against the German colonies in Africa. So it was thus sent, and not only sent but personally led, by Louis Botha, the Prime Minister of the Union, who had been the generalissimo of the Boer forces in the war with Great Britain. It is that Boer army of Louis Botha's that has driven the Germans out of Southwest Africa, and is now completing the expulsion of them from East Africa.

These things have been of much significance during the last two years, and they are today. But even greater is

their significance for the future. We have spoken of Germany's irrevocable loss of her colonies. It is irrevocable, because it has been inflicted upon her by British colonies, and those colonies are going to dictate the terms of peace at the end of the war, at least so far as the disposition of those spoils of war are concerned. To their dictation Great Britain will assent, because she does not purpose to repeat the disastrous blunder which she made in 1763. In the French and Indian War the French were expelled from the American continent by the people of the thirteen British colonies, precisely as the Germans have been expelled from Southwest and East Africa by the British colonies of South Africa. Those colonies, particularly Virginia, expected, of course, to get the Northwest Territory as spoils of war. Why not? They had conquered it, with their own blood and at their own expense. But Great Britain, with monumental injustice and folly, denied it to them, and annexed it to Canada instead. Historians know well that that was one of the chief causes of the Revolutionary War and of the Declaration of Independence.

Great Britain learned the lesson, and she will not now repeat that blunder. She will let her colonies dispose of the former German colonies as they wish; and we may be quite confident that in no case will that disposition involve return of them to Germany. In the utterance which we already quoted, John Morley said that "it would be a happy day for the Peace Society, that should give the Colonies a veto on imperial war." Again, we should enjoy hearing that repeated to Louis Botha and to the heads of Government of Canada and Australia and New Zealand; and their reply. For the sake of peace-at-any-price, it would be better to give Great Britain a veto on the belligerence of the colonies.

So we must reckon all of Germany's colonies irretrievably lost to her, and at the same time the British colonies welded more indissolubly to the United Kingdom. It is such a contrasting tale of two colonial empires as the world has seldom seen approximated.

### ARE WE "THE" AMERICANS?

WE are Americans. That is indisputable. By that we mean native and naturalized alike—all but the Hyphenates, who are neither fish, flesh, nor fowl, nor yet good red herring.

But are we "the" Americans, with anything like a monopoly of the name; and are we justified in calling our own country simply "America"? Perhaps the latter question is first to be considered, since in these days the people take their name from the country, rather than the country from the people.

There can be no question as to the official name. It is "The United States of America." That was established by the Declaration of Independence, by the Articles of Confederation, and by the Constitution. (Incidentally, for subsequent consideration, note that it is the United States of "America," and not of "North America.") Beyond doubt that is the name which is to be officially and formally used, in laws, treaties and state papers. But equally beyond doubt it cannot be commonly used, in familiar expression. It would be intolerably cumbersome to do so. Beside, it would be impossible to use such a phrase adjectively, or even in some cases substantively. We could not speak of "the United States of America Navy," or of "a United States of America citizen," but should always have to employ the prepositional form, and speak of "the Navy of the United States of America," and "a citizen of the United States of America."

Obviously, then, for common use we must have some shorter and simpler name. The choice lies between "America" and "The United States," and concerning their comparative merits, propriety, and authenticity there has of late been much public discussion. There has indeed been far more than circumstances warrant, since even cursory consideration unhesitatingly gives preference to the former, and more careful study confirms the choice. No doubt we shall always continue to speak of "The United States." Indeed it is desirable to do so in some cases, particularly in distinguishing between the Nation as a whole and an individual State. We shall and should speak of "the United States Government," and "United States Senators." But this is a term chiefly if not entirely for home use rather than for world-wide use; and even for home use it is not universally applicable. Thus while we may say "I am a United States citizen," we can scarcely say "I am a United Statesman," or "I am a United Stateser." Nobody would dare to use "United States" as the *leit motif* of a national hymn, and not even the most eloquent and impassioned orator could make effective use of it in a patriotic peroration.

In other respects the term is technically unfitting, because it is not specific in its designation. It does not necessarily denote this country. We are not the only United States. The official name of Brazil is "The United States of Brazil." The official name of Venezuela is "The United States of Venezuela." At least two other countries to the south of us formerly employed the same phrase, and may resume it again. "United States" has no geographical significance whatever, any more than "county" or "city." It is all right for a resident of New York to speak of "living in the city," and for a suburban commuter to speak of "going to the city"; but it would be preposterous—and also presumptuous—to speak of New York simply as "the city" when we were in Chicago or San Francisco. It is not the only city, and this country is not the only United States.

Where "United States" fails, however, "America" serves the purpose. True, there are objections made to our exclusive use of it; chiefly by two classes. First, there are some of our Canadian friends who profess to regard it as cheeky for us to call this "America" and ourselves "Americans," since Canada is just as much "America" as is the United States, and Canadians are thus "Americans" just as much as we. Literally and technically, from a purely geographical point of view, that is indisputably correct. Practically, from other points of view, it is quite unconvincing. The obvious answer to it is that neither the Canadians themselves nor any others ever dream of calling Canada "America" or Canadians "Americans." Least of all would that ever be done by those who raise this objection to our use of the name—who are generally of the type which George Ade had in mind when he wrote of the hero of one of his fables: "He may be English, but he is not sufficiently British to be a Canadian." The Canadian who objects to our calling ourselves Americans would be much offended if anyone were to call him an American. He would immeasurably prefer to be called a Briton.

The other objectors are of our own household, and are those estimable and valuable but generally tedious and often impractical persons known as purists. Their objection has a basis similar to that of the Canadians: namely, that other countries, both north and south of us, are "America," too, and their people are therefore also "Americans." Of course the answer to this indisputable but quite irrelevant fact is the

same as that already given in the case of Our Lady of the Snows, that none of these other countries or peoples use the name or want to use it or could be prevailed upon to use it. To this we may add one or two special answers to the purist. If he objects to calling this "America," he must also on a like ground object to calling it "The United States." Nay, he must altogether condemn and denounce our official "United States of America," since South America is just as much America as North America is, and therefore Brazil or Venezuela might as properly be called "United States of America" as we; and we should, more correctly, be known as "United States of North America." But even that would not be quite right, for that would imply that this United States embraced the whole of North America, just as "United States of Brazil" means the whole of Brazil, or "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland" means the whole of Great Britain and Ireland. We should therefore have to change it to "United States in North America"; though we are not sure that some ultra-purist would not find fault with that.

The use of "America" and "American" is, on the other hand, approved conclusively and convincingly on several authentic grounds. We might mention that of convenience, which in this case is so strong that it alone would justify the usage in the absence of any other. But there are others. There is, for example, the historical ground. The usage is older than the United States itself. Before the Revolution, as well as during that struggle, the Thirteen Colonies were called "America," to distinguish them from Canada and Florida and Louisiana, and their people were called "Americans." Every schoolboy recalls Chatham's famous speech: "My Lords, you cannot conquer America. . . . If I were an American, as I am an Englishman, while a foreign troop was landed in my country, I never would lay down my arms!—never! never! never!" Burke and Barre, Fox and Wilkes, and all their colleagues, habitually used the same words in speaking of this country. Nor did we disclaim the usage; on the contrary, we adopted and employed it. "The name of American," said Washington in his Farewell Address, "which belongs to you in your national capacity, must always exalt the just pride of patriotism"; and statesmen and orators and writers who have followed him in time have followed his example.



There is, too, the ground of practice. We have already referred to the fact that no other country calls itself "America," and that no other people call themselves "Americans," or wish to do so. It is equally true that all the peoples of the world recognize those names as belonging to this country and its people, and never apply them to any other, or interpret them as meaning any other. When a man, in London or in Berlin or in Tokio, proclaims himself to be an American, he is not asked whether he comes from Canada or from Argentina. He is recognized instantly and unhesitatingly as coming from the United States of North America. More and more this practice prevails, as the other states on these continents increase in age and importance and thus in attachment to their own local names. No Mexican or Brazilian wishes to lose his specific identity by being called an "American." Applied as at present to this country alone, in a political sense, "America" unfailingly denotes one certain, specific country, and "American" its people. Expanded to apply, in a political and social sense, to all the American continents, the one would denote any of the three dozen separate political entities into which the Americas are divided, and the other any of three dozen different peoples.

Perhaps the matter is not one of supreme and crucial importance to the welfare of the Nation. But since it has been so much brought to the fore, and since "Americanism" is being so much considered, it may be well to make it quite clear that we do not purpose to speak of "United Statesism," nor call ourselves "United Statesmen"; but that we do mean that this country, in a political and social sense, shall be called "America" and its people "Americans"; and that those words shall unfailingly denote nothing other than this country and its inhabitants.